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a b s t r a c t 
The purpose of this paper is threefold. Firstly, although there have been many articles and books describ- 
ing the nature of Action Research there are few examples of doing it in practice. We describe how a 
Research Oriented Action Research programme unfolded over many years focussing on the operationali- 
sation of theory alongside the development of a soft-OR methodology. An outcome of this programme 
was the refinement of an Action Research method. Secondly, we present the development of an un- 
derstanding of emergent strategy – a ‘theory’ that attracted both the researchers and managers in a 
number of organisations as one that could enhance the development of a soft-OR method and aid the 
process of strategy making. In doing so we demonstrate how research can be both rigorous and relevant. 
We also developed our understanding of emergent strategy in a manner that enables it to be used in 
practice. And thirdly, we show how the soft-OR method of Strategic Options Development and Analy- 
sis (SODA) methodology gradually became a strategy making methodology (Journey Making). Although 
much has been written describing the background to these soft-OR methodologies, this paper shows how 
and why they developed. We illustrate how relevant theory from a range of disciplines can inform prac- 
tice, and how the process of implementing theory into method develops theory. 
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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0. Introduction 
Effective operational research (OR) depends upon an appropri-
te understanding of the problem being addressed – finding the
right problem’ ( Ackoff, 1981 ). Over the past four decades, prob-
em structuring methods (PSMs) have been developed to help op-
rational researchers address the right problem ( Mitroff & Feath-
ringham, 1974; Rosenhead & Mingers, 2001 ). In particular, three
SMs have seen extensive use: Soft Systems Methodology (SSM),
he Strategic Choice Approach (SCA), and Strategic Options Devel-
pment and Analysis (SODA) ( Mingers & Rosenhead, 2004 ). Each
f these methods is grounded in particular views of organisational
ife, and to a greater or lesser degree has some theoretical basis.
hese methods frequently have been labelled as ‘soft-OR’. Predom-
nantly these soft-OR methods have been developed through con-
inual use in practice and in response to some of the perceived✩ The authors would like to thank three extremely diligent and helpful reviewers, 
ho have helped us significantly improve the paper. 
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377-2217/© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articleimitations of more mathematically informed OR. Consequently,
hese ‘soft-OR’ methods are open to the criticism that they are
ot adequately informed by sound theory. For example, soft-OR is
seen by many as having negative connotations within OR gener-
lly, implying imprecision and lack of rigour” ( Mingers, 2011 : 2). 
Given that operational research is intended to impact practice
nd has a history of doing so ( Williams, 2008 ), it would seem
ikely that OR, particularly soft-OR with its basis in problem struc-
uring and solving messy complex problems, could make a seri-
us contribution to the development of management theory. This
s particularly so as management and organisational scholars have
onsistently argued that the theory in these fields is not meeting
he double hurdle of rigour and relevance. Despite having played a
owerful role at the operational level of organisations, operational
esearch has had less impact on organisational strategy develop-
ent and the strategic decision-making of senior management
eams. This is notwithstanding ‘soft-OR’ methods paying consid-
rable attention to bounded rationality ( Huxham & Dando, 1981 )
nd the sort of satisficing ( Simon, 1956 ) that is necessary when
enior management teams are dealing with complex messy strate-
ic problems. That said, some OR writers have made attempts to
emonstrate the power of OR in helping strategy development (forunder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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m  example Dyson, 20 0 0; Dyson & O’Brien, 1998; Franco, O’Brien, &
Bell, 2011; O’Brien & Dyson, 2007 ), and also apply soft-OR in the
pursuit of resolving complex far-reaching issues which have strate-
gic implications ( Checkland & Scholes, 1999; Friend & Hickling,
2005 ). 
Given the earlier premise that soft-OR methods are developed
through use, in this paper we show that Action Research can be
a powerful and effective way of developing theoretically sound
soft-OR methods. In addition, by doing so, the development is
able to make a contribution to the elaboration and use of man-
agement theory, particularly in the field of strategic management.
In addition, Action Research, through its focus on robust practice,
can meet the double hurdle of rigour and relevance as evidenced
through work carried out by Checkland and Holwell (1998) . More-
over, although the nature of Action Research has been presented
in the literature, there are few, if any, examples of the reality
of doing Action Research and particularly of doing Research Ori-
ented Action Research ( Eden & Huxham, 2006 ) where the design
of method/technique/tool has also been a part of operationalising,
and so developing, theory. One aim of this paper is to provide such
a narrative. 
In order to demonstrate how theory contributes to the develop-
ment of method, and method development contributes to theory,
we present a real Action Research programme that (i) resulted in
the refinement of the Action Research method, (ii) elaborated and
developed the theoretical ideas behind emergent strategy and (iii)
illustrated the process of augmentation of a soft-OR method from
problem structuring through strategic problem solving to strategy
making. In addition we demonstrate that Action Research, which
depends upon using theory that is of interest to manager and re-
searcher, results in the development of a method that can impact
senior management teams when strategy making. 
We begin the paper with a brief discussion about the need to
attend to both rigour and relevance, and then continue with an
explication of the nature of Action Research. We follow with a re-
port on three cycles of an Action Research programme undertaken
over twenty years. In addition, we show how relevant theory from
a range of disciplines can inform practice, and how the process of
implementing the theory into a method expresses the usefulness
of theory. After each research cycle, involving many interventions 1 
(typically between 15 and 30), we show how our understanding
of the focal theory, namely emergent strategy, was developed and
how it influenced the design of the soft-OR method from prob-
lem structuring to strategic problem solving and finally strategy
making. At the end of each section discussing a research cycle, in-
volving many interventions, we summarise the elaborated notion
of emergent strategy. We finish the paper by reporting the insights
gained about Action Research in practice, the contribution to the
focal theory and implications for the development of method as
well as reflect on Action Research’s contribution to OR method de-
velopment. 
Thus, the contribution made by this paper is to: (i) provide
an illustration of the reality of undertaking Action Research along
with concomitant insights; (ii) illustrate its role in the elaboration
and testing of the usefulness of the idea of emergent strategy, and
(iii) present the role Action Research plays in developing method
(in this case a soft-OR method). 1 The interventions encompassed multi-nationals (e.g. Reed-Elsevier, Shell, ICL) 
and some that were national (e.g. AMEC). It included some SMEs as well as other 
national organisations in the private sector (e.g. large construction company) and 
others in the public sector (e.g. Strathclyde Police, Govan Initiative, and National 
Audit Office) and not for profit (Strathclyde Poverty Alliance). Some interventions 
were single one or two-day workshops, others encompassed an ongoing relation- 
ship. The work was with senior management teams of between 7 and 15 people. 
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A tension between rigour and relevance had been an important
ontext to our initial interest in soft-OR. This tension was typi-
ally expressed as a need to strike “the balance between OR as
 knowledge-oriented science or a problem-oriented technology”
 Corbett & Van Wassenhove, 1993 : 628). In particular the extensive
ebate following Ackoff (1979a) arguing that “The Future of Oper-
tional Research is Past” raised issues about elegance of so-called
olutions versus the pragmatism needed to deal with the messi-
ess of the real problems faced by managers ( Lilien, 1987 : 38) as
lients ( Eden & Sims, 1979 ). 
However, in addition, the last decade has seen many explicit
leas for rigour and relevance within the general field of busi-
ess and management research with pleas to pay attention to
his “double hurdle” ( Pettigrew, 1997 ). Thomas and Wilson (2009 :
78) commented that, “the ‘voice of practice’ has become lost”
nd Pearce and Huang (2012) reflect on how practicing man-
gers are becoming less and less engaged with management re-
earch. “Our goal should be to seek rigour and relevance through
oundary-spanning research focused squarely on phenomena of in-
erest to managers” ( Gulati, 2007 : 775). This focus on relevance
nd rigour raises the issue of how research should have impact.
ecently George (2016 : 1869) argued that “an impactful research
genda would preclude an overt emphasis on theoretical “gaps”
n the literature, and instead would move our collective attention
oward addressing problems or understanding emergent phenom-
na that are significant and relevant to our stakeholders”. This re-
uirement is a fundamental requirement for effective operational
esearch, particularly given the definition of OR provided by IN-
ORMS (2006): “OR is the discipline of applying advanced analyti-
al methods to help make better decisions”. 
Some writers have argued that the rigour-relevance gap is un-
ridgeable in management research ( Kieser & Leiner, 2009 ). We do
ot accept these views. We support the very often repeated notion
hat “nothing is as practical as good theory” ( Lewin, 1951 : 169).
hat we take this to mean is that, for the most part, theory must
e expressed in such a way that it is possible to design practice
s a reflection of the theory , even if it is academic researchers who
oncentrate on initial design and it is practitioners and managers
ho comment on that design through their experience of it. As
ummings and Jones (2004) argue, knowledge must be actionable
f it is ever to be useful to managers. This is very much the basis of
he origins of OR as developed and used from WW2 ( Kirby, 2002 ).
Theory grows and changes by shifting theory development from
pure research’ to practice based research, not as if either were
rong, but rather so that when brought together they enrich one
nother. In the work reported here we are aiming to act more as
 bridge in the value chain of knowledge production ( Starkey &
adan, 2001; Thorpe, Eden, Bessant, & Ellwood, 2011 ) by enrich-
ng theory and adapting theory into a form that can be applied
n practice. As Gulati (2007) suggests “theory building is a cumu-
ative enterprise and, as such, can only happen if we are explicit
bout both our theories and their impacts on managerial practice”
p780 our emphasis). 
Although practical relevance is of concern across all the fields of
anagement and organisation, specific concerns have been identi-
ed in relation to strategy research ( Baldridge, Floyd, & Markoczy,
004; Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992; Gopinath & Hoffman, 1995; Jarz-
bkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007 ) despite strategy research claim-
ng relevance to practice ( Bettis, 1991; Pettigrew, Thomas, & Whit-
ington, 2002 ). Acknowledging these particular concerns, this pa-
er uses an example from strategic management the concept of
mergent strategy. Concepts such as emergent strategy are often
ttractive to academics and have resonance with practitioners and
anagers. However, an important gap in strategic management re-
C. Eden, F. Ackermann / European Journal of Operational Research 271 (2018) 1145–1155 1147 
Fig. 1. The 1996 Action Research cycle (from Eden & Huxham, 2006 :396). 
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‘  earch appears to be operationalising such attractive concepts and
heories, and then using the process of operationalising as a basis
or developing these theories and concepts further to ensure both
elevance and rigour. In the example reported here it was the con-
ept of emergent strategy ( Mintzberg & Waters, 1985 ) that became
he research topic of interest to both ourselves and managers, par-
icularly as it emerged from research and engagement with the de-
elopment of a particular soft-OR method. 
.2. The nature of the Action Research method 
Action Research is an obvious candidate research method when
he objective is to explore theory in relation to practice. Action Re-
earch ( Lewin, 1946; Susman & Evered, 1978 ) emphasises knowl-
dge produced in the context of application. Organisational set-
ings provide rich data about what people do and say, and what
heories are used and usable, when faced with a genuine need to
ake action . “[Action Research] demands valuing theory, with the
laboration and development of theoretical constructs as an ex-
licit concern of the research process” ( Eden & Huxham, 2006 :
94). Action Research is not in competition with other ways of do-
ng research, rather it is appropriate with respect to specific aims
nd particularly where “the method is likely to produce insights
hich cannot be gleaned in any other way” ( Eden & Huxham,
006 : 396). 
An involvement with practitioners and managers 2 , however,
oes not necessarily guarantee successful contributions to knowl-
dge that can significantly influence both the development of the-
ry and managerial practice. There is a great danger that Action
esearch can be seen as a form of consultancy, where the engage-
ent with practitioners is simply a way of enabling academic re-
earchers to become involved in the practitioner world and then
evelop abstract theories as usual, but with the ability to hint at
n engagement with practitioners and managers. Careful avoidance
f this trap is necessary. Furthermore, not all Action Research will
eliver useful knowledge and action research can be done badly. 
The Action Research cycle ( Fig. 1 ) as depicted by Eden and Hux-
am (1996) was the initial basis for the research, where each re-
earch cycle was made up of many organisational interventions
panning different contexts. 
One outcome from our Action Research programme was a mod-
fication to the 1996 cycle ( Fig. 1 ). Thus, in meeting our first con-
ribution of this paper, providing concomitant insights in the pro-2 In this paper we refer to practitioners, whether it be OR practitioners or strat- 
gy practitioners, as those who will be applying the method as opposed to man- 
gers who will be experiencing it. 
i  
a  
t  
a  
c  ess of doing Action Research, the Action Research cycle was elab-
rated and adapted during the process of undertaking the research
eported in this paper. Fig. 2 represents this adapted version. This
ew version emerged, in particular, through being explicit about
hat constitutes the commencement of an Action Research study
nd the drivers of the cycles of research. The figure shows two as-
ects of pre-understanding as the starting point for undertaking
he research: being explicit about (i) the extant literature inform-
ng the initial understanding of the focal theory by the researchers,
nd (ii) the background tools and methods associated with the re-
earchers. This requirement for explication is in contrast to Eden
nd Huxham (2006) who recommend not making these two as-
ects explicit until the stage of writing up. In addition, there is an
xplicitly stated trigger – a driving force from both researcher and
ractitioner – that initiates the first research cycle and ensures its
elevance. It is the combination of pre-understandings and the trig-
er for the research that push the Action Research study into life.
n particular each of these is crucial for effective reflection on the
eries of interventions that form the first research cycle of the Ac-
ion Research programme. It is not possible to reflect properly on
he shortcomings of the theories that guide the attempt to opera-
ionalise theory without an explicit pre-understanding of the the-
ries that drive the design of the method. Our focus on a specific
re-understanding denies the notion that “theories quasi emerge
y themselves from the data (without any previous theoretical in-
ut)” ( Reichertz, 2010 :2). It is, however, perhaps important to note
hat in addition to the specific elements of action research shown
n Figs. 1 and 2 , an important aspect of any research is the contin-
al scrutiny that comes from colleagues through conference pre-
entations and publications and the research environment within
 research oriented institution. 
We undertook several cycles with respect to our research pro-
ramme, each Action Research cycle encompassing a series of in-
erventions, where each intervention sought to be faithful to the
oncepts and theories of interest. Each research cycle was: the ap-
lication of nascent theory through a designed soft-OR method re-
ecting our best interpretation of the theory, application of the
ethod with management teams in a real setting, methodical re-
ection on the intervention(s), and further exploration and devel-
pment of the theory, before commencing the next research cy-
le through another set of interventions. This research programme
ook place over a period of many years and involved between fif-
een and thirty interventions for each research cycle. Thus, each re-
earch cycle comprised: step 1 – the design step; step 2 - the intra-
ycle exploration of interventions yielding data leading to satura-
ion of both design and outcomes; and step 3 - the departure point
or the next cycle of Action Research (when saturation has been
chieved – i.e. enough data to be reasonably assured of robust con-
lusions). All three steps are regularly informed by or inform other
odies of theory (the step at the centre of Fig. 2 – “use other re-
earch and theory to inform”). 
Each research cycle within the study is explored and analysed
sing a range of data collected from each intervention before the
ext cycle is commenced. Action Research involves working with
 variety of different types of data sources. Reliable data relating
o organisational life is predominantly qualitative, situational (con-
ext matters), and is collected opportunistically as well as planned.
raditional tests of validity cannot be used easily and with confi-
ence ( Reason & Rowan, 1981 ). Validity issues can, in part, be ame-
iorated by having at least two researchers each using a different
lens’ discussing the results of each data set captured. Data also
ncludes, when possible, the implications of those actions man-
gers assumed to be the consequences of the intervention. In addi-
ion ‘saturation’ is helped by continual triangulation of data, within
nd across interventions, undertaken when seeking convergent and
ontextual validity ( Reason & Rowan, 1981 :240). In this research
1148 C. Eden, F. Ackermann / European Journal of Operational Research 271 (2018) 1145–1155 
Fig. 2. Starting the Action Research cycle: explicating pre-understanding and identifying the practice based trigger. 
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s  programme we faced the usual issues in collecting data about the
thinking of elites ( Ford, 1977; Pettigrew, 1992 ) where interview
protocols are difficult to adhere to ( Norburn, 1989 ). Much of our
data collection relied on informal discussion and comments as well
as more formal interview/reflection sessions with individuals and
in groups, taken alongside notes taken by both researchers during
workshops. Critical incidents provided a useful source of data – ob-
vious shifts in thinking and group behaviour, conflicts, etc. ( Bryson,
Ackermann, Eden, & Finn, 1996 ). 
As we stated above, during the methodical reflection period fol-
lowing each cycle (step 3), potential changes to the intervention
design are explored. The changes often result in the literature that
had guided its development being re-examined and re-interpreted
(as well as consideration of other published research). The reflec-
tion includes conclusions being checked for robustness by explor-
ing alternative interpretations. In addition the designed method
of each research cycle is continuously modified to reflect learning
from all previous interventions. The iterative process of comparison
between the method for a research cycle and the implications of
the data from the interventions explored in the cycle is continued
“until repetition from multiple sources is obtained. This provides
concurring and confirming data, and ensures saturation” ( Morse,
1994 :230). Action Research thus follows a ‘fine-grained methodol-
ogy’ which cycles between the worlds of practice and of theory
( Harrigan, 1983; Tranfield & Starkey, 1998 ). 
The development of tools/techniques/methods (in our case a
soft-OR method) that are manifestations of theory is a way of de-
veloping theory. The Action Research cycle develops theory in prac-
tice: Application : operationalise an idea/theory/notion through an
explicitly stated/ design ed method ; Action: apply the method; Re-
flect: understand the use and impact of the method; Explore: look
for theory to explain outcomes; and so further develop the method
and so the theory ; redesign the method. 
w  . Action Research in practice: exploring emergent strategy 
.1. Pre-understandings: our background 
In our work with management teams, we had developed a
roblem structuring method known as Strategic Options Develop-
ent and Analysis (SODA) ( Rosenhead, 1989 ). This development
ad been influenced by the sociality of defining the situation
 McHugh, 1968 ) and personal construct psychology ( Kelly, 1955 )
s ways of understanding sense-making ( Daft & Weick, 1984; We-
ck, 1995a ). The notion of theories-in-use versus espoused theories
 Argyris & Schon, 1978; Argyris & Schon, 1991 ) also provided in-
ights to our understanding of what people said was the problem
ompared with how they responded to it. The problem structur-
ng method designed to acknowledge these influences was addi-
ionally influenced by causal mapping in political science ( Axelrod,
976 ) which acted as a basis for a formal cognitive/causal mapping
ethod based on personal construct psychology ( Eden, 1988 ). Thus
he influential body of literature provided an initial view about
ow to operationalise sense-making in a problem structuring con-
ext through the use of cognitive and causal mapping – formulat-
ng a ‘soft OR’ method. 
.2. The trigger for the Action Research programme: a matter of 
enuine concern for practice 
SODA found its way into OR groups at several multi-national
rganisations where the OR practitioners were working along-
ide strategic planning groups. In each organisational setting cir-
umstances had presented (i) a practitioner-identified opportunity
or using the SODA method in the context of strategic problem-
olving, and (ii) practitioner frustration with the practicality of
hat they saw as interesting and potentially useful strategic man-
C. Eden, F. Ackermann / European Journal of Operational Research 271 (2018) 1145–1155 1149 
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sgement concepts, for example emergent strategy as presented by
intzberg and Waters (1985) . We, and the practitioners, felt the
se of the SODA OR method developed for problem structuring
ight put some flesh onto the detection of the emergent strat-
gy of the organisation. In particular, the OR practitioners saw
he problem structuring capabilities providing support with strate-
ic problem-solving and therefore a potential process for detecting
n emergent strategy , and the emergent strategy as being some-
hing that should be understood as a part of strategy making. This
hared interest became the trigger for the research. 
.3. Preunderstanding: the theoretical context and background 
The attractiveness of the notion of emergent strategy lay, in
art, in its link back to the explanation of organisational behaviour
s ‘muddling through’ as a “succession of incremental changes”
 Lindblom, 1959 : 86) and that “policy making is typically a never
nding process of successive steps in which continual nibbling is a
ubstitute for a good bite” ( Lindblom, 1968 :25). Each of these ex-
lanations had seemed appropriate to the situations our managers
njoyed. Mintzberg first defined an emergent strategy as the re-
ult of a “pattern in a stream of significant decisions” ( Mintzberg,
972 ). Mintzberg, (1978) later suggested that “the strategy-maker
erceived an unintended pattern in a stream of decisions and
ade that pattern the intended one for the future” (p946). Even
ater Mintzberg and Waters (1985) viewed emergent strategy em-
nating from a pattern in a stream of actions . Emergent strategy
ould be seen as the consequence of antecedent multiple activities
hat would need to be changed in order to stop or to alter the
trategy. “The crucial activities for decision making are not sep-
rate episodes of analysis. Instead, they are actions, whose con-
rolled execution consolidates fragments of policy that are lying
round, gives them direction, and closes off other possible arrange-
ents” ( Weick, 1983 ). “Strategies need not be deliberate – they can
lso emerge” ( Mintzberg, 1987 ). Each of researchers, OR practition-
rs and managers viewed the process of strategic problem-solving,
sing SODA, to be potentially one very effective way of detecting
mergent strategy. 
. The Action Research programme 
.1. Research cycle 1 (1992 onwards) – step 1: operationalise the 
heory by design of a method that reflects the theory 
As noted above, OR practitioners and managers were intrigued
ith the notion of emergent strategy, they also felt that the SODA
R method we had developed could help detect emergent strategy.
he detection of emergent strategy would assist with the strate-
ic problem solving. There had been many instances where the
roblems being addressed were considered to have major strate-
ic ramifications ( Ackermann, 1992 ). 
The original OR problem structuring design involved developing
ognitive maps for each management team member, ‘back-room’
erging these into a group causal map, and then presenting a sin-
le merged map back to the group for them to work on together
 Eden & Simpson, 1989 ). However, there are signficant time de-
ands associated with this design, where one-to-one interviews
re conducted, individual maps checked with each participant, and
hen time devoted to merging all of the maps each with typically
ighty to one-hundred-and-twenty nodes. For this reason, to meet
he needs of strategic problem solving, the method was changed
o that of building group causal maps with the simultaneous in-
olvement of all members of the team ( Bryson, Ackermann, Eden,
 Finn, 1995 ). 
This development of the method was a trade-off between seek-
ng to understand the emergent thinking of individual managersthrough cognitive maps) that would be expected to influence the
ehaviour of each of them, as compared to the creation of a group
ausal map that might be expected to reveal aspects of group be-
aviour. Both practitioners and researchers saw the method to be
 basis for operationalising the idea of emergent strategy by seek-
ng to detect it (as explicit patterns in a stream of thinking of the
roup) through an explicit process of strategic problem solving. 
Group causal maps were derived as participants were invited to
xpress their views of the important strategic issues facing the or-
anisation by writing these onto oval shaped cards and spreading
hem around a large wall and subsequently adjusting their posi-
ion to reflect thematic clusters. These thematic clusters were tem-
orary as they were subsequently adjusted to reflect causality as
articipants made judgements about how these strategic issues in-
eracted with one another. This resulted in the creation of a group
ausal map where new clusters emerged from the network of links.
ausality was seen as the basis for a group ‘definition of the situ-
tion’ facing the organisation where the group focused on means-
nds causality that was action-oriented and still reflecting princi-
les embedded in personal construct theory. 
The group map enabled managers to continuously surface and
efine issues, structure them through the links reflecting means-
nds causality and then refine the emerging map. It was under-
tood that as the picture on the wall began to stabilise, agreement
bout the prioritisation of issues could begin. This method was ex-
ected to reveal aspects of emergent strategy through the active
rocess of solving a strategic problem. 
.2. Research cycle 1- step 2: action focused interventions 
Analysis of the outcomes from over twenty interventions across
everal organisations in both the public and private sector consis-
ently left both researchers and managers involved with the sense
hat the outcomes were a significantly better representation of the
eal emergent strategic future of the organisation, as compared to
hat indicated by their strategic plans. 
The shift from merging individual interview maps into a single
ap to developing the map with the group using the ‘oval map-
ing technique’ appeared to be a helpful development in detect-
ng emergent strategy. The method enabled the multiple perspec-
ives to be captured ‘in real time’ allowing both for initial views to
e elicited but also for participants to ‘piggy back’ on each other’s
ontributions. 
As the interventions had progressed both managers and re-
earchers expressed the concern that paying attention to an emer-
ent strategy might inevitably be too embedded in the past. The
ethod for operationalising emergent strategy was derived from
ecognising the significance of problem solving in determining the
trategic future of the organisation. The method was, therefore,
een as perhaps too much of a focus on dealing with the present
nd so not capturing enough of a redesigned emergent strategic
uture. Counter to this view were arguments from managers that
heir definition of the situation necessarily anticipated worrying
utures in their problem definition. They argued that the emergent
trategising they had undertaken respected the manager’s ‘soft’
nd judgmental beliefs about the future that were not recognised
roperly in a strategic planning process. 
The strategy mapping was identified, by managers, as a pro-
ess of changing minds through a form of cognitive and social ne-
otiation, where the negotiation was founded on exploiting mul-
iple (individual) perspectives, expressed through the group map.
hus, multiple perspectives were leveraged and were in continu-
us change as a form of group perspective was developed through
he use of the model as a continuously changing artefact. Notably,
ttending to the multiple perspectives is a key characteristic of all
oft-OR methods. 
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3 Decision Explorer – banxia.com. Thus, at the end of the first two steps of research cycle 1, the
method for detecting emergent strategy was that of developing a
group casual map directly with the team rather than using indi-
vidual cognitive maps as the basis of a group map. This shift in
method had indicated the need for a greater focus on two impor-
tant processes as a part of detecting emergent strategy: the role
of real-time social negotiation and the process of individual man-
agers ‘selling’ their emotionally and judgmentally driven views of a
problematic future. These consistent outcomes suggested that the
cycle should draw to a close and a full review and reflection take
place – step 3 in Fig. 2 . 
3.3. Research cycle 1 - step 3: elaborate theory from practice and so 
extend the theoretical focus: what is emergent strategy? 
As an emergent strategy was being detected it was clear that it
was an active process of strateg izing rather than simply a strategy. 
How management teams resolved messy issues of strategic sig-
nificance had demonstrated the need to recognise the role of so-
cial negotiation in the process of agreeing a ‘solution’ to the prob-
lem. The process of developing a group definition of the situation
through the development of a group causal map suggested emer-
gent strategising reflecting the notion of the organisation as socially
negotiated order . 
The emergent strategising arose through the way managers ad-
dressed and managed key strategic issues. The strategic issues
were influenced by the published strategy, but individual expertise,
organisational politics, ‘taken-for-granteds’, culture, history, sys-
tems, and structure played a more significant role in the way strat-
egy emerged. In many respects the method was allowing emer-
gent strategising to be represented as a process that was getting
close to detecting theories-in-action rather than espoused theories
( Argyris & Schon, 1974 ). Emergent strategising, and so the emer-
gent strategy, belonged to, and was created by, the managerial
team in the everyday resolution of strategic issues, rather than pri-
marily through a planning process often undertaken by a support
group. 
In summary, the idea of emergent strategy in practice could
now be seen as emphasizing emergent strategizing, a process
rather than a form of strategy, and strategising as a negotiation of
priority issues and options, encompassing both cognitive and social
negotiation. 
3.4. Research cycle 2 (1996 onwards) – step 1: operationalise the 
theory by design of a method that reflects the theory 
In the move from the first to second Action Research cycle the
elaborated method thus required attention to the processes of cog-
nitive and social negotiation – building in theory derived from the
field of negotiation (see the central feature of Fig. 2 ). Our explo-
ration of the field of negotiation led to two particularly helpful
literatures, one ‘handed to us’ through serendipity. The first was
the writing of Strauss and Schatzman (1963) , and Strauss (1978) ,
where there is a notion of a hospital as a negotiated order (see also
Nathan & Mitroff, 1991 ). This conceptualisation led us to see the
outcome of research cycle 1 as revealing a form of socially negoti-
ated order and negotiated social order where solutions come from
social negotiation and involve changes in social relationships ( Eden
& Ackermann, 1998 : 4 8–4 9). 
The second body of literature was from the field of interna-
tional conciliation, and its impact on our understanding of research
cycle 1 was significant particularly the book on negotiation by
Fisher and Ury (1982) . This book presented a key aspect of effec-
tive negotiation, namely parties socially create new options rather
than ‘fight over old options’. As we revisited our research data this description of successful
egotiation appeared to explain the way in which the developing
roup causal map enabled participants to use the map as a contin-
ously changing definition of the problem revealing new options
rom the synthesis and elaboration of perspectives. This focus on
egotiation also, interestingly, paralleled the suggestion that OR is
ffective when seen as facilitating negotiation ( Eden, 1989; Eden,
ones, & Sims, 1994 ). The map was always in transition - acting as
 ‘transitional object’ - providing a way of the group seeing and
eveloping new options reflecting the process of emergent strate-
ising. 
The process of strategising was now seen as a process of ne-
otiation where the map as a transitional object was a continually
hanging record of the strategising. Our understanding of the role
f a transitional object was usefully informed by ideas from psy-
hoanalysis ( Winnicott, 1953 ) and much later with respect to or-
anisation science by Carlile (20 02, 20 04) . However, although the
ap changed as a reflection of the causal linking of points of view
rom different participants and the continual addition of elaborat-
ng views, the use of ‘ovals’ (in cycle 1) made continual edits of
tatements on the map difficult without losing the pace of the
orkshop. Thus, research cycle 2 demanded paying greater atten-
ion to enabling continuous transition, strategising , of the points of
iew as issues moved from belonging to an individual to belong-
ng to the group. The revised method, therefore, utilised computer
oftware 3 designed as the transitional object for facilitating inter-
ctive causal mapping: a form of group support system ( Eden &
ckermann, 1992 ). 
Finally, a search for an understanding of the way in which par-
icipants initially seemed to be ‘selling’ their own sense of what
as crucially important for success – making ‘claims’ on the future
f the organisation. The research of Dutton ( Dutton, 1986; Dutton
 Ashford, 1993; Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987 ) introduced us to
he notion of “issue selling”, a description that illustrated what we
ad been experiencing. Later this conceptualization was reinforced
y the research of Nutt (2002) into why decisions fail, and where
e explicitly discusses the idea of “claims”. Thus, issue selling be-
ame an integral part of research cycle 2. 
Recent research on the performativity of strategy focuses on
matters of concern as what drives participants to defend or evalu-
te a position, account for or dis-align with an action, or justify or
ppose an objective” ( Vasquez, Bencherki, Cooren, & Sergi, 2018 :2)
einforcing the need to attend to the issues and claims. 
In summary, the designed method (method 2) now encom-
assed a specific focus on: (i) facilitating negotiation : developing
ew options that were likely to be the synthesis and adaptation
f old options; (ii) using a more powerful transitional object (causal
apping software); and (iii) recognizing and legitimizing issue sell-
ng as a part of the intervention and as an important emotional
spect of emergent strategising. 
.5. Research cycle 2 – step 2: action focused interventions 
As with Research cycle 1, a number of interventions took place
around 20) providing a range of insights. Firstly, it appeared to the
esearchers (confirmed through comments from managers) that
he software version of the map had some important advantages.
he map’s ability to act as a transitional object helped the man-
gement team negotiate a continuous refining of the meaning of
ssues. The process allowed for continuous and easy editing of ma-
erial (both wording and causal links) so that group ownership of
he map developed as emergent strategising gradually developed.
t became clear that the visual interactive modelling element al-
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t  owed social readjustments to take place; as participants came to-
ether as a team each of their views was given more respect than
sual, and new social relationships developed (negotiating social
rder). The transition of meanings enabled new options to be de-
eloped through the amalgam and refining of issues – more op-
ions were explored and developed. Visual Interactive Modelling
VIM) following a similar path was becoming an important aspect
f OR ( Hurrion, 1986; Smith, 1986 ; Bell, 1991 ). 
Significantly, the detected emergent strategy was seen by man-
gers to be more intelligent and robust because it encapsulated the
epth of experience, specialist knowledge and expertise of specific
oles. Managers felt the resultant emergent strategic direction was
ignificantly less likely to lead to unintended, or unforeseen, con-
equences than the official strategic plan. 
In addition, the presentation of the map as a means-ends hi-
rarchy revealed that what one person regarded as an issue of
trategic significance was sometimes seen by others as operational.
eparating operations from strategy was regarded as unhelpful to
trategising: managers not only explored the ‘what’ of strategy
aking but also the ‘why and how’, the means-ends agreements;
s such they could not usefully separate these two aspects of op-
rations and strategy in managing the future of the organisation. 
The process of developing an emergent strategy meant there
as no need to go through a stage of ‘making decisions’, as the act
f continually refining the map (both in terms of the statements
hemselves and the map as a whole) resulted in agreements grad-
ally emerging. As an emergent strategy was detected a deliberate
trategy was being formed. 
However, some problems became apparent. The ability of the
apping software to move statements and associated relationships
the causal links) around easily and so continuously rejig the pre-
entation of a map into a hierarchy meant that the fast changing
nd complex nature of the map also, on occasion, confused man-
gers. This confusion indicated a need for a clearer conceptualisa-
ion of the nature, or structure, of emergent strategy so that com-
lexity could be managed without it being reduced. Categorising
tatements with respect to a view of their nature as a part of a
trategy appeared to be the next development, but not by seeing
ome as strategic and others as operational: another conceptual
tructure of strategy was required. 
.6. Research cycle 2 – step 3: elaborate theory from practice and so 
xtend the theoretical focus: what is emergent strategy? 
The focus on negotiation as a critical part of a method for oper-
tionalising emergent strategy now seemed obvious and reflected
he idea of organisations as negotiated order as well as strategy
s “patterns in a stream of decisions” ( Mintzberg, 1978 ). However,
he impact and relevance of the work of Fisher and Ury on under-
tanding the process of emergent strategising was profound. The
rocess of members of a management team continually negotiat-
ng and renegotiating their view of the organisation’s strategic is-
ues came alive through the use of a transitional object: a grad-
ally stabilising ‘picture-on-the-wall’. The role of continual transi-
ion facilitated cognitive shifts: the essence of emergent strategy.
o too was the group developing new options that reflected future
pportunities rather than the constraining influence of a strategic
lan. As such this focus on future opportunities appeared to res-
nate with Isenberg’s (1987) view regarding the reality of oppor-
unism driving strategic futures thus further establishing the work
n the extant literature. 
The reality of issue selling was now reflected in the method of
etecting emergent strategising and was enabling and encouraging
onnection between agreed actions and emotions. The act of sell-
ng issues was emotional – the method was legitimising anxieties
bout the future and the commitment of the managers to theirwn role in creating a successful organisation. Detecting emergent
trategy was grabbing the attention of managers and reinforcing
he significant role of emergent strategy as the driver of an organ-
sation’s future. 
Thus, emergent strategy now reflected both analysis (through
roblem structuring) and the role of emotion in delivering organ-
sational change (via issue selling through to negotiated agree-
ents). However anxiety about the future, in contrast to the plan-
ing focus on goals, was revealed as a crucial and legitimate as-
ect of emergent strategising. This led to our conceptualisation of
negative goals’ ( Eden & Ackermann, 2013 ). Negative goals, rather
han constraints, express an aspiration to avoid a potential disaster.
hus, negative goals appeared as an important aspect of emergent
trategy, and one that in many ways reflects research suggesting
hat managers focus on dealing with issues ( Mintzberg, 1975 ). 
In summary, the idea of emergent strategy in practice could
ow be seen to encompass: social and cognitive negotiation in the
reation of new options through the use of a transitional object,
he emotion of issue selling, the indivisibility of strategy and oper-
tions and the role of negative goals. 
.7. Research cycle 3 (20 0 0 onwards) – step 1: operationalise the 
heory by design of a method that reflects the theory 
The experiences of research cycle 2 implied elaborating the
ethod (method 3) for research cycle 3 focusing specifically on
anaging the complexity of strategising by exploring the structure
f emergent strategy. 
Exploration of extant theory that would help understand the
trategy structure led to the work of Ackoff and Emery (1972) on
urposeful systems. This work resonated on two levels. The first
eing the use of a systems perspective: the map was a network, a
ystem, of issues. The second being the focus on purpose, together
ith a clear and definitional approach to a hierarchy of goals.
ettigrew’s (1977) suggestion that strategy is about the “manage-
ent of meaning” provided another important focus on the way
n which the structure of a causal map provided meaning not just
hrough the words in statements but more importantly through
he implications for change implied by what is causing something
in-arrows) and why it matters (out-arrows) ( Eden & Ackermann,
010 ). 
Through these theoretical concepts the method for research cy-
le 3 focused on the development of mapping coding rules that
elped represent the structure of emergent strategy ( Eden & Acker-
ann, 2001 ). Maps had been predominantly a ‘means-ends’ hierar-
hy and for strategic problem solving they had been further struc-
ured as options/actions leading to goals/objectives. In method 3,
tructure was maintained but elaborated to include strategies sup-
orting goals, strategies encompassing strategic programmes that
ncluded more operational actions, and, agreed actions that were
dentified as particularly potent because they impacted many goals.
In addition, the previous action research cycle (research cycle
) had identified the significance of anxiety where managers wor-
ied about avoiding disasters – these were categorised as ‘nega-
ive goals’. Understanding this aspect of the structure of emergent
trategy took us back to Mintzberg’s research on the nature of a
anager’s job ( Mintzberg, 1972 ) where he argued that managers
evote most of their time dealing with issues, and so by implica-
ion potentially addressing negative goals (whether explicit or im-
licit). His research suggested that the structure of strategy conver-
ations, and so emergent strategy, might appropriately arise from
 starting script that focuses on issues, and then encourages elab-
ration upwards in the hierarchy towards goals and downwards to
trategic options. 
Another outcome of the research cycle 2 had shown that
he distinction between operational and strategic was problematic
1152 C. Eden, F. Ackermann / European Journal of Operational Research 271 (2018) 1145–1155 
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4 Group Explorer is software that permits each participants to contribute state- 
ment and links to the transitional object (causal map) in the own time and anony- 
mously, as well as declare their own judgments about the emerging material 
through subjective rating or ‘voting’. The facilitator is able to monitor activity on 
a continuous basis. The software is freely available through the authors. ( Ackermann & Eden, 2011a ). The implication in our hierarchical
structure was that conceptual distinctions should not be treated
as if they were easy to determine, although managing complexity
required conceptual clarity, the method should nevertheless reflect
a fuzzy boundary between, for example, goals and strategies and
actions/options. Thus, an emergent strategy would reflect the full
extent of both strategic and operational considerations. 
3.8. Research cycle 3 – step 2: action focused interventions 
The focus of this cycle of interventions had been expected to
be less demanding than the previous cycles because we had been
used to using some form of mapping based conceptual structure
for operational research based problem-solving interventions. This
proved to be the case, with saturation occurring more quickly than
the previous two research cycles involving around 15 interventions.
However, as the research cycle progressed the analysis of the
emergent strategy maps gradually utilised more analysis tools than
expected ( Eden, 2004; Eden, Ackermann, & Cropper, 1992 ). For ex-
ample, exploring the map through hierarchical cluster analysis re-
vealed the emerging strategic arenas or themes that exercised the
management team. It became important to use these arenas as an
agenda for the development of agreed strategic programmes by
making sure that each cluster showed at least one strategic pro-
gramme designed to address the theme. Similarly, the use of anal-
ysis embedded in the software for finding feedback loops became
an important recurring task as the map developed. The recogni-
tion of, in particular, vicious cycles became a key outcome of the
detecting emergent strategy design. Vicious cycles were, of course,
not a part of an emergent strategy per se as they had not hitherto
been acknowledged however identifying their presence was impor-
tant if effective strategy was to be produced. The beliefs about
the future that created the potential vicious cycle often derived
from the explicit merging of the beliefs of several individuals and
reflected, therefore, the interactions between the perspectives of
people in different roles. Consequently, as the group moved to-
wards using detecting emergent strategising as a basis for agreeing
a deliberate strategy, the development of strategies to reduce the
impact of vicious cycles were important to identify and manage. 
Unsurprisingly the development of an emergent goals system
( Eden & Ackermann, 2013 ) that included recognition of negative
goals turned out to be a crucial outcome of this research cycle
of interventions. The emergent goals system was always compared
with the official goals system and the emergent goals system was
consistently seen as a more realistic reflection of the future pur-
pose of the organisation. The emergent goals system reflected what
the power brokers in the organisation wanted to achieve, and so
would seek to achieve, rather than that laid out in the official
plan ( Eden & Ackermann, 1998; Eden & van der Heijden, 1995 ). It
was these features of the cycle that reinforced a developing view
that emergent strategising was, in practice, a key aspect of the ac-
tual strategy of an organisation and a powerful determinant of the
strategic future of an organisation, and that it could be detected
and used to help create a realistic deliberate strategy. 
3.9. Research cycle 3 – step 3: elaborate theory from practice and so 
extend the theoretical focus: what is emergent strategy? 
As a result of seeking to manage the complexity of the emer-
gent strategy maps, an emergent strategy was seen to fit, in some
respects, a conceptual structure that reflected the aspiration and
purposefulness expected to be a part of a traditional strategy. But,
there are important distinctions and elaborations. 
Detecting emergent strategy had become the preface for agree-
ing a deliberate emergent strategy – a strategy that was regardeds both realistic, because it based on an emergent strategy and yet
lso aspirational. 
The deliberate emergent strategy reflected a hierarchy of causal-
ty (means-ends/how-why) that encompassed both operations and
trategy with a fuzzy boundary between these two aspects. Signifi-
antly operations and strategy were not separate considerations for
hanging an organisation’s future – they were integrally linked. 
The deliberate emergent strategy also recognised a role for neg-
tive goals. Negative goals were aspirational, in the sense that they
ere not constraints but rather involved actively strategising about
voiding disastrous futures. The means-ends hierarchy therefore
as capped by a goals system which is a network of interlinked
oals that are good outcomes in their own right and yet also sup-
ort and are supported by other goals. The goals system itself is
 hierarchy. This structure of strategy provided a basis for strategy
onversations that exploited emergent strategising. 
. Theory development 
In this illustration of a real Action Research programme we
ave presented three cycles of the programme. In reflecting upon
hem (and subsequent Action Research programmes) it was inter-
sting that each cycle focused primarily on one particular theo-
etical development. Research cycle 1 focused on emergent strate-
izing as an active process through sense-making to detect emer-
ent strategy, research cycle 2 focused on negotiation (both social
nd cognitive), issue selling and the role of a transitional object in
ense-making, research cycle 3 on managing complexity through
he structure of emergent strategy and so the analysis of strategy
aps. There was one further cycle relating to this research topic
hich did not advance theory but did advance the method. This re-
earch cycle brought into play theories of Procedural Justice ( Tyler
 Blader, 20 0 0 ) and the development of a Group Support System
 Group Explorer 4 ) to reflect the significance of procedural justice
nd also of negotiation ( Ackermann & Eden, 2010 ; Ackermann &
den, 2011a ; 2011b ). 
Thus, in summary the primary theory development about emer-
ent strategy was: 
Research Cycle 1 - emergent strategy is an active process of
trategising rather than simply a strategy – thus emergent strate-
ising not emergent strategy; management teams socially create
ew strategic options through the explicit convergence and linking
f perspectives and through a process of cognitive and social nego-
iation leading to changing of minds and agreement of priorities; 
Research Cycle 2 - emergent strategy reflects both analysis and
he role of emotion in delivering organisational change (i.e. issue
elling through to negotiated agreements); anxiety about the fu-
ure , in contrast to the planning focus on goals, is a crucial and
egitimate aspect of emergent strategising; the conceptualisation
f ‘ negative goals ’ and their importance in an emergent strategy –
negative goals” rather than constraints, express an aspiration to
void a potential disaster; and operations and strategy are inextrica-
ly linked . 
Research Cycle 3 – the significance of the role of detecting
mergent strategy as the preface for agreeing a deliberate emer-
ent strategy; developing a strategy that is both realistic, because
t based on an emergent strategy, and also aspirational; and is also
ased on a coherent structure of strategy . 
These aspects of theory development, in turn, became re-
ected in the developing soft-OR method that gradually shifted
C. Eden, F. Ackermann / European Journal of Operational Research 271 (2018) 1145–1155 1153 
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urom SODA (Strategic Options Development and Analysis) to Jour-
ey Making (JOintly Understanding and NEgotiating strategY)
 Ackermann & Eden, 2011a; Eden & Ackermann, 1998 ). 
. Conclusions 
We set out to address three aims in this paper: doing Action
esearch in practice and its implications for the Action Research
ethod; Action Research for the development of theory, manage-
ent research that is rigorous and relevant; and the role of Action
esearch in developing soft-OR. In this final section we summarise
ur conclusions with respect to each of these aims. 
The process of writing this paper inevitably forced reflection in
epth on the Action Research process being followed ( Eden & Hux-
am, 2006 ). This reflection led to a different view of the Action
esearch cycle (from what is presented in Fig. 1 ) where the expli-
ation of pre-understanding was now a key feature and the role
f encompassing new theory a more fundamental part of the cycle
see Fig. 2 ). 
The research programme discussed in this paper, shows that
ction Research demands attention to detailed design, deep un-
erstanding of the extant literature with respect to its implica-
ions for practice, and perhaps most significantly a willingness
o engage with practitioners over long periods of time. Notably
he Action Research cycle needs to be thought of as many mini-
ycles/interventions (in this research program between 15 and 30
or each research cycle) before saturation occur. Aspects of the de-
igned methods sometimes need to be ‘dumped’ as they are not
iewed as relevant and or valued by a management team, and a
alancing act maintained between working with the messiness of
rganisational life intersected by a desire to embed thoughtful co-
erent design that influences practice and yet reflects good theo-
etical ideas. 
We introduced this paper by reference to the issues of making
perational research/ management research both relevant and rig-
rous. The research we report here demonstrates that Action Re-
earch in practice can deliver rigour and relevance, as long as it
s conducted as Research Oriented Action Research to distinguish it
rom “forms of action research that do not have research output
s their raison d’etre” ( Eden & Huxham, 2006 : 388). In particu-
ar the process of developing soft-OR through Action Research is
 particularly significant opportunity for operationalising and de-
eloping promising theory – in this case making the concept of
mergent strategy meaningful for strategy making in practice. In
he debates on rigour with relevance there is often a presumption
hat application presumes the knowledge to be complete prior to
ts use in practice and that the issue of gaining relevance is sim-
ly that of translating the knowledge further down the knowledge
hain ( Thorpe et al., 2011 ). The work reported here strongly sug-
ests that knowledge will become increasingly more complete as it
s applied in practice. Developing operational research techniques
nvolves working with managers on their problems and so through
ttempts to apply theory it is well placed to ensure rigour and
elevance. Managers are part of the knowledge production pro-
ess – through providing feedback. So too are OR practitioners as
hroughout the development of the method (from SODA to JOur-
Ey Making) countless discussions have taken place. 
Furthermore the apparent linearity of the process is to some
xtent not a true depiction of what occurs; Action Research com-
rises research cycles which constitute not only insights from the
articular set of interventions taking place within the cycle but
lso through reflections on interventions or literature exploration
ained from later research cycles’ impact and influencing develop-
ents made in earlier cycles. As such this paper reflects a macro
xamination of the research programme. Moreover, in order to
resent a clear view of the process of Action Research this paperas necessarily presented a view that is tidier than the reality of
he research process but has done so without diverging from the
ogic as described. 
In sympathy with Tranfield and Starkey (1998) the focus of this
ype of research is directed towards design for practice – exactly
he nature of OR. As Tsoukas and Chia (2002) write, “only a direct
erception of reality will enable one to get a glimpse of its most
alient characteristics – it’s constantly changing texture; it’s indi-
isible continuity; the conflux of the same with the different over
ime. […] Only by placing ourselves at the centre of an unfolding phe-
omenon can we hope to know it from within ” (p571, our emphasis) .
eep theoretical and practical insights come from (i) the process of
nderstanding theory from the perspective of application, (ii) the
rocess of designing theory for practice, (iii) application with man-
gers determined to get value from it and act on its implications,
nd (iv) undertaking a continuing cycle of elaboration and redesign
f ideas and theory and its re-application. Therefore, in essence,
ccepting “that theory is approximated” ( Weick, 1995b : 386) in the
eld of organisational studies, and so will usually need elaborat-
ng towards creation of a strong theory and legitimate knowledge
 Suddaby, 2014 ). Thus, by being solution-oriented there is a natural
ffinity with Action Research as both seek to help managers con-
ronting business problems in a manner that is robust. We there-
ore see operational research and Action Research as overlapping
nd complementary. 
In this paper we have discussed the application of Action Re-
earch in practice: practice from theory (a soft-OR method) and
heory from practice (emergent strategy). The Action Research pro-
ramme used to illustrate Action Research was designed to develop
 method that morphed from problem structuring to an effective
trategic problem solving and ultimately strategy making method;
n OR ‘design for practice’, building on the concept of emergent
trategy. The research evolved through the use of the focal and ad-
itional concepts and theories that seemed attractive and apposite
o both the researchers/authors and to senior management teams
nd practitioners. As such, it should not be a surprise that an im-
ortant outcome of this project was the requirement for Action
esearch, and the development of a soft-OR method, to be open
o an inter/trans-disciplinary approach to the application of theo-
ies that are presented in the literature as if sitting within a sin-
le discipline. Behavioural OR is now beginning to legitimise open-
ng up OR to consider wider aspects of the organisational world
a widening that was being argued for in the OR literature in
he 1970 ′ s and 1980 ′ s ( Ackoff, 1979a, 1979b; Dando & Eden, 1980;
den, 1978; Eden, Jones, & Sims, 1983; Jackson, 1997 ). 
The research represented here suggests that Action Research
timulates managers and practitioners in exploring other promis-
ng related ideas from the management research literature. In some
espects this creates the potential for ‘never ending cycles’ where
 new research cycle is introduced from the previous cycle and
here saturation of one concept development naturally leads to
he encompassing of new research avenues. In our case the re-
earch focus on emergent strategy generated interest in compet-
tive advantage as ideas from the resource based view became
ntwined in discussion about developing competitive advantage
 Bryson et al., 2007 ; Eden & Ackermann, 2010 ), and also in stake-
older management ( Ackermann & Eden, 2011b ). There were not
lear break-points between each research foci as there are not clear
reak-points between the research cycles. Operational researchers,
nd particularly practice oriented OR academics, can exploit such
pportunities. 
For those considering using Research Oriented Action Research
or the design of OR method the following guidelines may prove
seful: 
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 1. being willing to pay attention to the detailed design of the re-
search, including the key initial theoretical and practice drivers,
2. developing an on-going and deep understanding of the extant
literature with respect to its implications for practice, 
3. being willing to engage with practitioners over long periods of
time, 
4. recognising that aspects of the designed methods sometimes
need to be ‘dumped’ as they are not viewed as relevant and
or valued by a management team 
5. maintaining a balance between working with the messiness of
organisational life intersected by a thoughtful coherent design
that influences practice and develops good theoretical ideas 
6. appreciating that managers and OR (or other discipline) practi-
tioners are part of the knowledge production process 
7. being open to eliciting insights not only from the interventions
taking place within the focal cycle but also through reflections
on interventions or literature exploration gained from later cy-
cles, 
8. being open to encompassing theory across a range of disci-
plines. 
Designing methods that operationalise good ideas/‘theories’
that can be used by others and that reflect sound theory has pro-
vided us with the privilege of not only working intimately with
some impressive senior management teams but additionally see-
ing the results of the interventions embedded within organisa-
tional practice. In seeking to design methods that adequately re-
flect theory the requirement for clear explication of their use in
practice means they can be used by others – in our case by oper-
ational researchers and consultants. To some extent soft-OR is vul-
nerable because the modelling approach is easy to apply it poorly
( Ackermann, 2012 ). Research Oriented Action Research (ROAR) of-
fers an opportunity to attack this vulnerability as dispel the ac-
cusations that soft-OR is too atheoretical. OR has an opportu-
nity/skills to take ‘good’ ideas from management theorists and con-
vert them into rigorous, well-grounded and relevant and usable
method. The work has also supported Dyson’s (20 0 0) view that
Problem Structuring Methods (soft-OR) provide a valuable aid to
managers in the strategy arena (see also Franco, Bryant, & Hindle,
2007 ). 
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